This paper develops a model of public exchange whereby voters and education policy makers exchange with one another within school districts. Because school district consolidation lowers alternatives to voters-parents , consolidation is hypothesized to raise public education spending because weakened intergovernmenta l competition allows policy makers to promote their own utility, rather than that of constituents. Models of public education spending and academic performance are estimated over 1988Ð 1990. While evidence indicates little support for the traditional treatment of the Leviathan hypothesis that greater competition lowers public spending, this paper argues that education spending by itself does not fully provide a valid test of the Leviathan hypothesis since spending, by itself, does not necessarily indicate the quality of public education programmes. Empirical evidence indicates that greater numbers of schools and school districts promote higher student achievement as evidenced by higher math and verbal SAT scores, math pro® ciency of 8th graders, and lower high school drop-out rates. Evidence therefore suggests that, while greater numbers of school districts and schools are, to some degree, associated with higher public education spending, higher student achievement appears to follow as well.
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I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
United States. The ® rst arises because public schools pro vide 90% of primary and secondary education and therefore There is growing perception that the educational system of crowd-out private schools that otherwise might inject the United States is in decline and, because the public sector greater competition into the education market. Parents is the dominant supplier of education, criticism naturally must pay twice for education when they send children to focuses on the public school system. While it is often argued private schools since payments for public schools are not that spending has declined, public education spending voluntary. School choice policies are aimed at curtailing the (1989Ð 90 dollars) per pupil rose 74% from 1960 to 1992, or public education monopoly because they provide public from roughly $2979 to $5196. 1 Despite this spending in-funds for parents who choose private schools for their crease, combined SAT (Student Achievement Test) scores children. 3 Until widespread support for such policies arises, fell 5.2%, or from 948 to 899 over this same period. 2 the public education sector will likely remain insulated from Two structural characteristics describe the delivery of private competition. The second characteristic follows from primary and secondary levels of public education in the dramatic reduction in numbers of public school districts:
from 108 579 to 14 741 over 1942Ð 1987 . Although some of spending and academic performance will suggest how past this consolidation may have been motivated by the argu-consolidation of school districts has in¯uenced the public ment that greater scale economies would result, public edu-education system. cation is now characterized by fewer suppliers. This paper addresses the second characteristic by devel oping a model of public exchange whereby voters and I I . EX C H A N G E I N P U BL I C E D U C A T I O N education policy makers exchange with one another within MA R K E TS school districts. The in¯ uence of school district consolida tion is examined within the context of the Tiebout (1956) Public education policies arise from exchange between e� ect whereby voters search for desired public programmes voters and policy makers. Voters, or primarily parents in the within a system of many competing public suppliers. Be-case of education, signal preferences to policy makers cause consolidation lowers alternatives to voters-parents through voice and exit options. 5 Voice options include and, following the Leviathan model of policy makers (Bren-voting and expressing views directly to policy makers. Exit nan and Buchanan, 1980) , consolidation is hypothesized to options are primarily in¯uenced by ® scal structure and, raise public education spending because weakened inter-under a federalist structure, dissatis® ed parents may move govenmental competition allows policy makers to promote from one school district to another as they search for de their own utility, rather than that of constituents. As a point sired education policies. 6 Exit options may be exercised of departure from earlier studies, this paper argues that, when parents conclude they cannot e� ectively in¯ uence while consolidation is predicted to raise spending, this result local educational policies through voice options. Exiting is does not necessarily coincide with the Leviathan model `voting-with-you r feet' in the model of voter behaviour because higher education spending does not necessarily developed by Charles Tiebout (1956) . The Tiebout model imply lower quality programmes. Higher spending, by itself predicts that, because citizens search for desired packages of does not necessarily imply anything about programme government programmes, like-minded citizens tend to as quality. Higher spending could ® lter down to student learn-semble in the same political jurisdiction. One result of this ing and re¯ect higher quality programmes. Of course, higher search process is that residents of local governments are spending could also simply re¯ ect higher amenities pro-fairly uniform in their preferences for public programmes. 7 vided to policy makers that may be unrelated to higher Families, for instance, may congregate in communities with quality education. This important distinction is not many good schools and playgrounds and senior citizens addressed in the current literature on school consolidation. may congregate where there are many adult education Examination of how numbers of schools in¯ uence spend-classes and stringent noise ordinances. Studies support this ing and academic performance is another point of departure conclusion when they ® nd that, when communities with taken in this paper. During this era of school district diverse populations have relatively few school districts, consolidation, numbers of schools have dropped as well:
there tend to be greater numbers of private schools. 8 In from 89024 in 1929 to 61407 in 1989. 4 Previous studies have other words, when numbers of school districts do not ad implicitly assumed that all schools within a given school equately support the many tastes of diverse populations, district provide identical services to parents. This is unlikely private schools enjoy larger markets for their services. since, even when school districts mandate standardized edu-Two bene® cial consequences of parental mobility are likely cation policies across all of their schools, it is likely there is within a system of many competing school districts. First, some, or much, variety in the teachers, sta� , facilities, parents have many choices and, under certain conditions, surrounding neighbourhoods , and students that make up mobility leads to a Pareto-e� cient equilibrium whereby no the educational experience. Qualities of individual schools parent may leave their school district and, at the same time, may therefore vary widely within school districts and it is gain higher utility. Second, policy makers are more respon reasonable to test whether numbers of schools exert inde-sive to parental preferences when unhappy parents may eas pendent in¯uences on spending and academic performance.
ily relocate to competing districts and, in this way, jeopardize Models of state public education spending and academic funding bases of school districts that lose customers. performance are estimated over 1988Ð 1990. Examination of School district consolidation is therefore hypothesized to how numbers of school districts and schools in¯ uence both lower exit options by limiting suppliers and, consistent with the Leviathan model, lead to expanding budgets that re¯ect narrow interests of policy makers, who may include teachers, union o� cials, and sta� . Further, higher spending re¯ ects higher salaries, shorter working hours, more gener ous pensions, and other forms of compensation that may bear no relation to the quality of public education. Sup porters of this view generally advocate school choice pol icies because local school o� cials are hypothesized to be less responsive to demands for higher quality education when there are fewer choices for parents. The Leviathan view is that credible threats of exit are the only e� ective means of improving programme quality. Because consolida tion lowers exit possibilities, this view predicts that policy makers may more easily raise budgets in pursuit of narrow self-interests. But, while greater consolidation limits exit options, the fact that higher spending may result does not necessarily imply that programme quality does not improve as well. A competing view is that improvements in educational quality require higher salaries, numbers of teachers and school buildings; i.e. public education quality and funding levels are synonymous. Supporters of this view are often critics of school vouchers, but, at the same time, subscribe to the predictions of the Tiebout model. Vouchers lower costs of exiting public school districts since parents are provided subsidies to send their children to private schools within their own communities. Vouchers make it cheaper to send children to competing suppliers Ð private schools Ð and parents no longer must move to another public school district when they exit their local public school system, as long as there are quality private schools in their local community. Critics of vouchers are fearful that mass exiting of students will leave public school districts with lower funding, and therefore to an erosion of public education quality. Moreover, since vouchers do not normally cover full tuition costs, poor parents are believed to be less able to a� ord private schools and therefore, as higher income par ents exit the public system, funding bases and quality will erode further.
A related argument is often advocated by proponents of the current public school system: that school district con solidation exploits scale economies that provide cost sav ings to taxpayers. However, while there may be economies of scale in education, it is questionable that the sizable consolidation of school districts has been prompted entirely by attempts to lower costs. Kenny and Schmidt (1994) argue that attempts to exploit scale economies is only one of three factors that explain much of the decline in the number of US school districts over 1950Ð 1980. The other two factors are growth of state aid, which lowered quality di� erences between districts, and the growing powers of teachers' unions such as the National Education Association that used consolidation as a means of lowering costs of organiz ing their membership. This ® nding is consistent with casual observation showing that public education spending measures, such as spending per pupil, have risen over this era of rapid consolidation. The degree to which consolida tion may have led to greater scale economies is therefore open to question because it is likely that consolidation exerts other in¯ uences on public school spending. Kenny and Schmidt (1994) ® nd that numbers of school districts in states are always substantially greater than numbers that would be predicted based solely on attempts to gain greater scale economies. Therefore, economies of scale are only one possible factor that determines the relation between school consolidation and spending.
The relationship between educational expenditure and educational quality may also have a close analogue in the regulation literature. The Averch and Johnson (1962) e� ect, for instance, arises when regulators reward ® rms that allocate resources toward capital and thus leads to over capitalization. Daugherty (1984) expands upon this idea by considering how regulation may encourage ® rms to be ine� cient due to the Averch and Johnson e� ect and various incentives to in¯ate costs. In the case of education, higher spending may arise from over-capitalization or salaries in excess of productivity and, in such instances, the connection between higher spending and product quality becomes un clear. Another interesting possibility is that school adminis trators may be rewarded on the basis of spending-per-pupi l or teacher-pupil ratios. The point of this discussion is that the relationship between expenditure and quality is unclear without further information on the incentives facing school district administrators.
I I I . E S T I MA T I O N O F E D U C A T I O N S P E N D I N G E Q U A T I O N S
There has been substantial testing of the Leviathan hypoth esis that greater intergovernmenta l competition results in a smaller public sector, as usually evidenced by lower public spending. Empirical evidence is mixed and, in part, arises from di� erent testing methodologies. 9 Oates (1985) , Forbes and Zampelli (1989) and Heil (1991) ® nd no support for the hypothesis. Support, full or partial, is found in Nelson (1986 Nelson ( , 1987 , Wallis and Oates (1988) , Zax (1989) and Raimondo (1989) . With the exceptions of Oates (1985) and Heil (1991) , which examine cross-national data, these studies focus on state and local governments. Another group of studies, which include the federal government in their testing, report mixed results as well. Support is shown in Marlow (1988) , Grossman (1989) , Marlow (1990, 1991) and no support in Oates (1985) and Heil (1991) .
Several studies speci® cally examine how numbers of school districts in¯ uence public education spending of ele mentary and secondary schools. Burnell (1991) tests the hypothesis that greater centralization leads to higher expen ditures per pupil on a data set of 280 counties from the 1977 Census of Governments. Her model holds constant the following factors: size of county, teacher salary, pupilÐ teacher ratio, property tax base, state education grants, median income, and percentage of students in local popula tions. Numbers of school districts exert positive and signi® cant in¯ uences on per pupil education spending. No sup port is therefore found for the hypothesis that school district consolidation lowers intergovernmenta l competition and fosters higher public spending. This result may suggest that consolidation fosters scale economies that results in lower spending. Kenny and Schmidt (1994) report some evidence that fewer school districts exert signi® cant and positive in¯ uen ces on expenditures per pupil. It should be noted, however, that intergovernmenta l competition is measured di� erently than in Burnell (1991) : a dummy variable takes a value of 1 when the number of school districts per student in a state is less than the value at the twenty-® fth percentile, and 0 otherwise. Another reason why this study may not sup port Burnell's is that it uses the state as the unit of observa tion, rather than counties.
This survey indicates that there is little consistent evid ence on the school consolidation issue. This paper argues that, while the Leviathan model predicts that consolidation raises spending, higher spending by itself does not necessar ily support the Leviathan model. In addition, the literature implicitly assumes that all schools within a given school district are equal in the eyes of parents. This is unlikely, even though school districts may attempt to standardize educa tion policies across all of their schools. Personalities and quali® cations of teachers, sta� , students, and day-to-day practices of individual schools are likely to vary widely within large school districts. It is therefore reasonable to test whether numbers of schools exert independent in¯ uences on spending and performance. These important issues are now examined in the following manner. First, the relationship between numbers of school districts (and schools) and spending is estimated so that our results may be compared with those previously reported. Second, the relationship between school districts (and number of schools) and stu dent performance is estimated to clarify what e� ect numbers of suppliers exert on programme quality.
The following models of cross-state education spending are estimated for 1988, 1989 and 1990 : 1987, 1988 and 1990 , is based on ease of data availability. 1 1 Signi® cance of estimated coe� cients is based on twotailed tests at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Data for EXP i , S T UDEN T i , S T A T E i , FED i , DIS T RIC T S i and SCHOOL S i are obtained from the Digest of Education Stat istics (1992, 1993) . Data on Y i , EDUC i , DENSI T Y i , are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). Sources for L IBERAL i and UNION i are discussed below.
The median voter theorem predicts that median voters control spending decisions and median income Y i is there fore hypothesized to be positively related to education spending. Previous studies argue that higher educated voters tend to vote for more education and therefore a posi tive coe� cient is hypothesized for EDUC i , average educa tion of the population. Population density DENSI T Y i measures the percentage of the population living in urban areas and, because production costs are commonly believed to be higher in urban areas, it is hypothesized to be posit ively related to education spending. The student percentage of the population S T UDEN T i controls for cross-state dif ferences in student populations and is hypothesized to exert positive in¯ uences on education spending since higher values may re¯ ect greater parental demands for education.
The state share of education funding S T A T E i controls for the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) hypothesis that more centralized funding leads to the perception by taxpayers that local funding burdens are lower than under less central ized funding. 1 2 That is, the lower the cost perceived by taxpayers, the greater the demand for public education. Moreover, if higher values of S T A T E i lead to greater spend ing equalization among schools and school districts, then there may also be fewer quality di� erences within a state's public education system and therefore fewer potential gains that parents may experience by relocating to another school district or school. The federal share of education funding FED i is hypothesized to exert similar in¯ uences on public education spending.
L IBERAL i is an index of the voting tendencies of US Senators reported in the National Journal. The simple aver age of the 1986 scores for both Senators in each state is used. An index of 40, for example, means that a Senator is more liberal than 40% of the Senate on economic issues. This index controls for the possibility that states characterized by more liberal voters might have larger public education budgets as well.
Union e� ects on education spending follow from studies demonstrating that, when unionized, public sector workers earn higher compensation than when public sector workers are not unionized. For example, ® re® ghters (Ashenfelter, 1971; Ehrenberg, 1973 and Ichniowski, 1980) ; teachers (Gallagher, 1978) , and police o� cers (Trejo, 1991) have been shown to bene® t from unionization in the public sec tor. Marlow and Orzechowski (1996) ® nd that greater pub lic employee unionization leads to higher overall public spending as well. The percentage of employed wage and salary public employees who are union members UNION i measures the role that public employees play in decisions over education spending. An alternative measure, percent age of employed wage and salary workers who are covered by union contracts, was also considered but, because the results do not change, estimations using this alternative measure are not shown here. Data for 1986 provided in Curme, Hirsch and MacPherson (1990) are used since this is the latest available year for this data. While it would be preferable to directly measure union penetration of school employees, these data are not available at the level of the state for years examined in this study.
As previously discussed, the Leviathan model predicts that fewer school districts lead to higher education spending because this re¯ ects less intergovernmental competition in the public education market. The hypothesized sign on DIS T RIC T S i , numbers of schools per 1000 students, is therefore negative. SCHOOL S i , numbers of schools per 1000 students, is also separately considered because it is questionable that all schools within given school districts are identical. Greater numbers of SCHOOL S i are hypo thesized to lead to lower spending since this indicates greater competition in the public education market.
Initially, OLS estimation was conducted, but given the relatively large number of regressors which appear to be insigni® cant, estimates which allow for correlation in the error term were generated. The SUR model of seemingly unrelated regressions was estimated and are shown in Tables 1Ð 3. 1 3 If the disturbances of the equations are corre lated, the SUR estimator is more e� cient since it takes the entire matrix of correlations of all equations into consideration. Table 1 reports SUR estimates of education spending per student equations for 1988, 1989, and 1990 . Median income is found to exert the hypothesized positive in¯ uence on education spending in four of six equations. Education, urbanization (with one exception), state funding, federal funding, and liberal variables are never statistically signi® cant from zero. Student share of the population exerts a signi® cant and positive in¯ uence in three cases. The union variable exerts the hypothesized positive, and statistically signi® cant, in¯ uence in all cases. Numbers of school districts never exert signi® cant in¯ uences. However, numbers of schools always exert positive and statistically signi® cant in¯ uences on education spending and therefore provides evidence counter to the Leviathan model of public spending. Table 2 reports SUR estimates of education spending as percentages of GSP for 1988 GSP for , 1989 GSP for , and 1990 . Median in come and education exert no signi® cant in¯ uences. State funding (with one exception) and union variables never exert signi® cant in¯ uences on education spending. Urbaniz ation exerts negative and signi® cant in¯ uences in all cases, and is counter to its hypothesized positive in¯ uence. Stu dent-shares of population exert expected positive in¯ uences on education spending. Negative and signi® cant in¯ uences (in all but one case) from federal shares of funding are contrary to expectations. Positive and signi® cant in¯ uences from the liberal character of states are as hypothesized. For 1988 and 1989, both numbers of school districts and schools exhibit positive and signi® cant in¯ uences on education spending. While, in 1990, no signi® cant in¯uence is found in the case of numbers of school districts, numbers of schools exert a positive and signi® cant in¯ uence.
Estimation of student performance equations
So far, some evidence of a positive relationship between public education spending and numbers of school districts and schools has been determined. Although the previous literature would have concluded that this evidence fails to support the Leviathan hypothesis of a negative relationship between public education spending and numbers of com petitors, this paper argues that such evidence does not necessarily reject the Leviathan hypothesis. The Leviathan hypothesis also suggests that greater intergovernmental competition, or school competition in this case, fosters high er quality education programmes. The connection between education spending and programme quality is therefore ambiguous. Higher education spending (via greater interschool competition) could simply re¯ect higher compensa tion for school personnel or it could also re¯ect higher quality programmes.
To examine this issue, the following models of cross-state educational performance are estimated:
The dependent variable, PERFORM i , includes four meas ures of student performance: Student Achievement Test (SAT ) scores for mathematical skills, SAT scores for verbal skills, pro® ciency in mathematics content areas for 8th graders in public school, and drop-out rates of high school students. All measures of PERFORM i are obtained from the Digest of Education Statistics (1992, 1993) , except drop out rates, which are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Pro® ciency in mathematics content areas for 8th graders in public school and drop-out rates are only available for 1990.
It should also be mentioned that an extensive literature exists which discusses interpretation of student performance measures. Studies, for instance, have analysed the in¯ uence of individual characteristics (Spector and Mazzeo, 1980;  Leppel, 1984; Park and Kerr, 1990) , the impact of di� eren tial test presentation (Marso, 1970; Schmitt and Scheirer, 1977; Gohmann and Spector, 1989) , and student perception of pre-® nal assessed work (Mudambi, 1996) on perfor mance. These important caveats suggest that all compara tive measures of academic performance have shortcomings and also indicates a need to examine di� erent measures of performance in our empirical study. Median income and average education are expected to exert positive in¯ uences on test scores and negative in uences on drop-out rates because higher-income and higher-educated populations are expected to demand higher educational achievement. Urbanization controls for the possibility that lower educational achievement arises in urban public schools and unionization controls for the possibility that it positively in¯ uences educational achieve ment. T AKE i controls for the percentage of high school students who, in their senior year, take the SAT test. It is expected that T AKE i is inversely related to test scores because, the higher are percentages of test-takers, the lower are average expected scores since larger test-taking pools suggest growing pools of lower-aptitude students.
Numbers of school districts and schools are expected to positively in¯ uence test scores and negatively in¯ uence drop-out rates since these variables re¯ ect the degree of competition in the public education market. Eberts, Schwartz and Stone (1990) provide indirect evidence of this relationship when they conclude that, from a sample of elementary students in 287 schools, student achievement is inversely related to school size. They ® nd that schools with more than 800 students are much less e� ective in fostering mathematics achievement than schools with fewer than 200 students. Greater numbers of schools may therefore lead to higher performance because they lower such factors as student Ð teacher ratios. Table 3 reports SUR estimations of student performance based on mathematical and verbal SAT test scores. Median income exerts hypothesized positive and signi® cant in¯uen ces in only two of 12 regressions. Average education exerts no signi® cant in¯uence. Urbanization only exerts a positive and signi® cant in¯uence in two cases of the mathematical test scores. Unionization exerts positive and signi® cant in¯uences on test scores. Percentages of students taking the SAT exert hypothesized negative in¯ uences and are highly statistically t-statistics below estimated coe� cients. a, b, c: signi® cance at 1, 5, 10% levels (2-tailed tests) or greater.
I V . C O N C L U S I O N
Previous tests of the Leviathan hypothesis have examined whether numbers of school districts exert negative in¯ uen ces on public education spending. This paper provides no support for this hypothesis. While no statistically signi® cant relationships are found for education spending per pupil, positive and signi® cant relationships are determined for regressions on education spending as percentages of GSP in 1988 and 1989. Broad support is also found for a positive relationship between numbers of schools and education spending (per student and as a percentage of GSP). There fore, evidence indicates little support for the traditional treatment of the Leviathan hypothesis that greater competi tion lowers public spending. This paper argues, however, that education spending by itself does not fully provide a valid test of the Leviathan hypothesis since spending, by itself, does not necessarily indicate the quality of public education programmes. This paper extends the testing of the Leviathan hypothesis by examining the relationship between public education qual ity and numbers of school districts and schools. Empirical evidence indicates that greater numbers of schools and school districts promote higher student achievement as evidenced by higher math and verbal SAT scores, math pro® ciency of 8th graders, and lower high school drop-out rates. Evidence therefore suggests that, while greater num bers of school districts and schools are, to some degree, associated with higher public education spending, higher student achievement appears to follow as well. These results suggest support of the Leviathan hypothesis since greater interschool competition fosters higher quality public educa tion programmes. This evidence therefore also suggests that the growing monopolization of the public education market through school district consolidation has led to a deteriora tion of the quality of public schools. Examination of how vouchers may inject competition into the education market would appear to be a useful avenue for future research on what public policies may do to promote an improvement in the quality of the public education system.
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